Public discourse over the minimum wage often boils down to a debate between those arguing the adverse effects of minimum wage increasesÂ-specifically to teenagersÂ-and those arguing the benefits of increases to those specifically in poverty. Opponents of the minimum often argue that because most minimum wage workers are either teenagers or secondary earners,2 a minimum wage intended to assist the poor is poorly targeted. As a result, there will be lower employment among the primary segment of the labor market that earns the minimum wage: teenagers.3
They also argue that were it even true that there are minimum wage workers with family obligations, the answer to low wages is not higher wages, but training and education so that these workers can acquire the requisite skills to advance from the secondary labor market to the primary one. 4 Supporters argue that raising the minimum wage will alleviate poverty and may also narrow the widening wage gap of recent years. They argue that most minimum wage earners actually are adults with family obligations, and that the only way for them to live above the poverty wage is to pay them a living wage.5 At a minimum, this requires raising the statutory minimum wage.
Opponents of the minimum wage have successfully localized the conflict by narrowly focusing the debate on both the youth labor market and skills deficiencies. By positing the argument narrowly in terms of a youth disemployment effect, opponents successfully make the political case that the minimum wage is not an issue that most of us should care about. By treating supporters as only concerned with matters of poverty, they have successfully defined the parameters of debate as a standoff between those arguing the youth disemployment effect on the one hand and those arguing the poverty benefits on the other.
For supporters, however, the issue has always been much larger. Over the last century proponents of the minimum wage have couched their arguments in terms of macroeconomic questions: how best to achieve greater efficiency and create a more just society6Â-a society where people who work are entitled to an income that enables them to live in dignity and out of poverty because it is a matter of fairness. Minimum wage supporters have generally attempted to socialize the conflict by placing the debate in terms of a societal issue (i.e., an issue of concern to all because it affects us all) rather than as only a poverty issue (i.e., a narrow issue of concern to only a small sub-population). Moreover, Congress has been more likely to pass minimum wage increases when there has been a clear base of political support, and this base has tended to be organized labor. 7 Though some of the contemporary discourse on the minimum wage bears some similarity with the past, much of it is very different. Indeed, the concept of the minimum wage has undergone several rhetorical permutations. Initially conceived of as a living wage during the late nineteenth centuryÂ-a wage sufficient to maintain a basic level of subsistenceÂ-it later was seen as a family wage, as that which would promote a family because it would support the family. Then during the early part of the twentieth century, it became a minimum subsistence wage for women. With passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 1938, the minimum wage became an official weapon in the policy arsenal designed not only to assist the working poor but to prop up wages generally. In some parts of the country it was viewed as a larger effort to achieve economic development.8
In recent years, however, broader visions of the minimum wage, that is, using the minimum wage to achieve larger macroeconomic goals such as wage stabilization or higher incomes because it would produce greater purchasing power among consumers, appear to have gotten lost. Specifically, the perception that the War on Poverty and Great Society programs of the 1960s failed led some to conclude that the minimum wage too, by virtue of association, would also be an unsuccessful tool for assisting the poor. Because advocates of minimum wage increases often argue the benefits of increases to the poor, the concept continues to suffer from association with poverty policy in the United States.
It is ironic, then, that those arguing for a broader view of the minimum wage are expressing it in the earlier language of a "living wage." Various municipalities have passed living wage ordinances mandating that companies doing business with them pay their employees a living wage. Though there are differences to be sure, the rhetoric is all too familiar: people who work for a living are entitled to a wage that enables them to live above the poverty line with a measure of dignity. Supporters of recent minimum wage increases would, no doubt, argue that their support of the hikes was motivated by these ideals. The problem is that all too often the minimum wage is associated with poverty policy, which is problematic because poverty policies do not generate the same popular support as do broader labor market policies that may benefit workers generally. In this essay, I argue that rhetoric employed both for and against the minimum wage has been, and continues to be, a product of the political environment in which it is framed. Rhetoric is the language that both expresses ideology and masks it. It is also the language through which political movements express themselves. Specifically, rhetoric is a product of the political environment, and as such it has implications for political and social outcomes.
From Living Wage to Minimum Wage Several municipalities, including Baltimore, Los Angeles, and Detroit, have passed living wage bills and others, like Kalamazoo, are in the process of adopting them.9 Ordinances differ from statutory minimum wages in that municipal living wages require only those companies doing business with them to pay the specified wage. The Los Angeles City Council, for instance, recently voted to force the Department of Water and Power to adopt its living wage ordinance that requires contractors to pay $7.15 an hour.10 In Detroit, voters approved in a referendum a living wage ordinance requiring all contractors doing more than $50,000 in business with the city to pay at least $7.70 an hour plus health benefits. If benefits are not included, they are required to pay a minimum of $9.63 an hour.11
That such ordinances have been passed reflects the assumption that the current federal minimum wage of $5.15 is inadequate to alleviate poverty and that the debate over the minimum wage in recent years has perhaps been too narrow. The minimum wage is not enough to support a family; the living wage should be that which enables one to do so. Or, at the very least, the living wage should enable an individual to support one's self above the poverty line in dignity. Indeed, when President Clinton ran for office in 1992, he campaigned on a platform that everyone who works and plays by the rules is entitled to live above the poverty line. Those who argue for a "living wage" would no doubt argue that such a wage is key to independence. By earning such a wage, workers will not be dependent on the state. Moreover, given the message of recent welfare reform that greater independence (defined as non-reliance on the state) is expected of individuals, living wages would appear to be critical to that realization.
Writing in the Los Angeles Business Journal, Madeline Janis-Aparicio, the executive director of the city's Tourism Industry Development Council, argued that the living wage would actually eliminate dependency on the public health care system, cutting back on the burden on that crumbling structure, and it would address the concerns of many in the business community who are not publicly subsidized and pay their employees fairly. These employers face unfair competition from other companies that are publicly subsidized but underpay their employees.12
And in a letter to the Los Angeles city council and the mayor, a group called "Business for a Living Wage," wrote:
We believe that responsible business results in higher returns. Our experiences and research bear out that firms with human resource policies such as those contained in the L.A. Living Wage Ordinance reap a range of benefits that actually reduces costs and enhances product quality. Turnover is reduced, worker morale and productivity increase, and a larger pool of residents can afford to buy our products. Far from detracting from successful business enterprise in Los Angeles, the Living Wage Ordinance, properly implemented and monitored, can be a huge benefit to the business community. 13 Though framed within a different economic context, the language above does echo the living wage debates during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Then it was believed that workers should earn enough to support themselves and their families, and those who earned a living wage would be more productive because higher wages would both improve their morale and enable them to better maintain themselves.
Historical Development of the Minimum Wage
At the beginning of the century, arguments for the minimum wage revolved around achieving greater efficiency because it would allow workers to better maintain themselves. Among the foremost proponents of this view was English economist Sidney Webb, who argued that a legal minimum wage would have the positive effect of increasing productivity. A wage floor would be beneficial to employees and employers alike, because better-paid people would be able to work harder because they have greater energy, due in large measure to their ability to better sustain themselves. Moreover, the greater morale among employees deriving from higher wage rates would lead to greater loyalty to their employers. A legal minimum wage, then, would positively increase the productivity of the nation's industry by ensuring that those who are left unemployed would be the least productive members of the workforce. Not only would employers be forced to look for the best workers so as to increase their overall productivity, employees would be forced to develop their skills so that they could be counted among the better class of workers.14 On this side of the Atlantic, prominent economist John Bates Clark argued that the absence of a minimum wage essentially triggered a process whereby employers chose from the ranks of the most necessitous men and women. Writing in the pages of the Atlantic Monthly, Clark observed:
Mere need and helplessness give citizens a certain valid claim on the state, even though it has done nothing to cause their troubles. Privation that is traceable to social defects makes a more cogent claim. This, in fact, is the basis of the demand for minimum wage laws, since the ill-paid workers are regarded as victims of social arrangements.15
While such arguments employed language of efficiency and greater productivity to justify governmental regulation of wages, otherwise considered an abridgement of personal freedom, they also assumed, in part, that in the absence of such regulation personal independence would be greatly undermined. The republican tradition in the United States stressed the independence of individuals as the basis for citizenship. 16 One could only be independent to the extent that one could control one's own labor. Those forced to work for others, to in fact work for wages, lost control of their labor and hence themselves. By this notion, then, wage labor was just another version of slavery. The living wage that was talked about during the latter part of the nineteenth century, then, represented an attempt by wage laborers to not only be independent, but to cast aside the perception of their work as slave labor.
The image of wage labor as slave labor is often associated with Marx's critique of capitalism found in his tract on labor processes in Capital.17 But the roots of this position in the United States stem from the republican tradition from which many American political institutions were founded.18 Within this republican frame of mind, slavery and independence were not compatible. The concept of citizenship was literally grounded in a system of property ownership. Property owners were both independent and free citizens of the republic; slaves were not. But the economic foundations of the early republic that allowed individuals to be independent were changing. The great economic transformations that Karl Polanyi wrote about were forcing more and more people into wage labor. 19 At issue for organized labor was how to make wage labor respectable. Also at issue was how to ground the essence of citizenship within a system of wage labor, where property ownership was not in land but in the labor power workers could sell.
Lawrence Glickman argues that most workers, especially organized workers, who sold their labor on the marketÂ-that is, people who earned wagesÂ-lost ownership of themselves to someone else who then had a great amount of power over them. The economic transformations that were taking place also effectively subverted the gender system within the working class in the sense that men in their employment situations assumed a dependent status analogous to women in the home. Men forced to work for wages were no longer able to see themselves as independent citizens, but in effect became children in much the same way as women. Because wages were so low men who worked for wages saw themselves as no different from prostitutes. The concept of a living wage, however, would enable them to rise above the shameful image of a prostitute. Social reformers and labor leaders who advocated living wages during the late part of the nineteenth century viewed the living wage as that which would enable workers to achieve full citizenship. Moreover, social reformers argued that not only were employers paying substandard wages and hiring inefficient workers, but that they were in fact parasites on the community.
Marilyn Power has argued that for reformers seeking to establish minimum wages for women, the parasitic industry argument proved to be a powerful tool, because it effectively placed the burden on employers. Though often couched in the language of efficiency, the potential for greater efficiency would not necessarily have to be demonstrated so long as the case could be made that firms paying below subsistence-level wages were parasites. Power notes that by adopting the parasiticindustry analysis academics and reformers were able to offer two separate explanations for the existence of unfairly low wages. First, they pointed to the disadvantaged bargaining position of individual unorganized workers vis-Ã -vis employers. Second, employers who took advantage of their workers' vulnerable position were parasites on society because they were effectively receiving a subsidy from the community. Parasitic employers who paid less than the true social costs of labor could undersell their competition. They also were not motivated to lower costs further through innovations, organization, or production techniques. Because the argument suggested that higher wages would result in higher productivity, they could appeal to the self-interests of the middle classes and enlist their support for low-wage workers. But unlike Webb, who truly sought to achieve greater efficiency, efficiency was not the primary goal of these reformers. Rather they sought to demonstrate the great costs being incurred by the working classes as a result of rapid industrialization.20 The goal, in short, was the attainment of higher wages for the working poor, but in efforts to appeal to a larger base of political supporters they employed the rhetoric of efficiency, productivity, and parasitic industry.
Nevertheless, as the economy was undergoing this great transformation, the focus shifted away from whether one worked for wages to the level of the wage, with a distinction made between living wages and subsistence wages.21 Though the living wage was never precisely defined in dollar terms, it was thought that it should be high enough to enable a man to support a family. The family wage therefore was not the same as a statutory minimum wage, which was conceived of as a subsistence wage to be applied only to women. For men, it was believed that living wages could be achieved by joining labor unions. Women, however, were not allowed to join unions and so minimum wages applicable only to them would similarly free them from the same type of shame that men felt by virtue of having to work for wages in the first place.
The notion that a living wage would preserve the moral dignity of families was not merely a rhetorical device. For women in particular, the concept of a minimum wage would literally save them from a life of prostitution. A common argument for why women should receive minimum wages was that the minimum wage would better enable them to safeguard their morals. Among the twentieth-century reformers, Emile Hutchinson made the point that women's wages, which had long been low relative to men's, were of particular concern because of the relationship to morality issues: "It decides the girl's companionships, her amusements, her ability to gratify without danger her natural and reasonable tastes, her very capacity for resistance to temptation. Its physical effects open the way to moral dangers."22 Women who could not earn subsistence wages might find themselves pulled in the direction of prostitution, which at the time was not illegal. In a similar vein, social reformers argued for mothers' pensionsÂ-the forerunner to the Aid to Families with Dependent Children programÂ-because these pensions would enable them to safeguard their morals while also caring for their children, which in the reformers' view was best done in the home.23 At the same time, these same social reformers were not feminists in today's sense. The language often used during this period in support of minimum wages for women was that of a "women's" wage, but relative to a living wage earned by men. Alice Kessler-Harris sums it up this way:
That men ought to be able to support wives and daughters implied that women need not engage in such support. They ought to be performing home duties. Thus if a woman earned wages, the normal expectation was that she did so to supplement those of other family wage earners.24
As much as reformers wanted to achieve more equitable pay for women, they also believed that the idealÂ-though it would not necessarily apply to themÂ-would be for women to be paid equally to men, but with the goal of effectively excluding women from the labor market so that they would stay home with their children. 25 Despite these varied terms, at root was a desire to achieve a minimum wage. To a large extent, there was little difference between a living wage, which was also a family wage, and a minimum wage for women, despite the fact that the concept may have conjured up different images for different people. Yet, the different terms were not merely plays on words. The use of language in part reflected the political realities of the time.
During the early years, at precisely the time that these different terms were being employed by different movements, there also were constitutional limits placed on the imposition of wage controls for men that did not exist for women. Men enjoyed liberty of contractÂ-the ability as free and equal citizens to negotiate with their employers the terms under which they would work for a living. Women, however, did not enjoy the same liberty of contract because the courts did not view women's citizenship in quite the same way they did men's. The court in Adkins viewed women as equal citizens because, through constitutional amendment only three years before, they acquired the right to vote. As a result, women enjoyed the same liberty of contract as men.27 Because the minimum wage was viewed as the only type of wage regulation attainable for women, those who advocated a minimum wage for women also saw it as a vehicle for attaining a living wage.
Susan Lehrer makes the argument that social reformers during the Progressive era did not challenge the practice of a gender segregated labor market or its underpinning assumption that women's primary place was in the home. But protective labor legislation played an important role in the process of defining the position of working women in industrial capitalism. Social reformers viewed protective labor legislation as one means of limiting the initial exploitation and orientation of women workers. At the same time, these laws were seen as contributing to labor productivity by forcing employers to use labor more "effectively." That is, employers forced to pay women a higher wage would opt to hire their husbands because of the belief that they were more productive, and women would then be able to remain at home.28 Still, there were many women in the labor force at the time who were not married, and for them such reforms were seen as a necessary ingredient to providing them with subsistence and guarding their morals.
The American Federation of Labor (AFL) initially opposed statutory minimum wages because they wanted men to join labor unions, but later came to support minimum wages for women. The union's principal goal was to raise men's wages to a level adequate to support a family. 29 The AFL believed that hiring women would effectively impoverish whole families. Women were thus urged to adopt strategies that would enable them to remain at home as wives and mothers. Therefore, it was often argued that the cost of women's low wages was not borne by women, but by society as a whole. As Vivian Hart suggests, many of those who argued for a minimum wage "often did so with a heartfelt preference for the idealized family of the family wage and gendered welfare state."30 From the standpoint of the labor movement, a minimum wage restricted to women would in no way undermine men's ability to bargain for an even higher wage, particularly since women were not able to join labor unions.
The Minimum Wage as Macro Policy Willis Nordlund has argued that the history of the minimum wage in the United States could essentially be viewed as a quest for a living wage.31 Although this may largely be true, the economic environment of the time would indeed affect how the minimum wage was conceived as well as the rhetoric employed to sell it.
During the Great Depression of the 1930s, the minimum wage wasn't simply viewed as a measure for obtaining subsistence, but as a larger macroeconomic policy aimed at achieving stability. At a time when wages were depressed, both wage floors and policies encouraging unionism would serve to prop up wages and provide workers with purchasing power. Particularly in the South, where wages were considerably lower than in the North, the minimum wage was viewed as a vehicle for achieving economic development.32 The South's limited industrial capacity was concentrated in low-wage, low-productivity industries, such as textiles, hosiery, and lumber. New Deal planners, including President Roosevelt, believed that jobs in only the advanced manufacturing sector would pay high wages and provide the purchasing power and tax base necessary to stimulate the economy in the South. The Roosevelt administration also believed that high wages would increase the efficiency of Southern workers. Through minimum wages, first through the industry codes of the National Recovery Act (NRA) and then the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), not only would wages of unskilled workers rise, thereby offering them greater purchasing power and a better standard of living, but employers would also be encouraged to modernize. The minimum wage would effectively make the South more efficient.33 Indeed, Roosevelt was quite clear on this when he expressed the following sentiment: "It is my conviction that the South presents right now the Nation's No. 1 economic problemÂ-the Nation's problem, not merely the South's. For we have an economic unbalance in the Nation as a whole, due to this very condition of the South."34 And in testimony before Congress, a business leader supportive of the minimum wage but opposed to a North-South wage differential expressed himself as follows:
I feel, first, that the South has suffered more than any other area that I know of through a traditional low-wage policy. We ought to establish a wage that is a reasonable minimum for a man who is head of an average American family. Owning mills, as I do, in the North and South, I would not like to see a differential in the bill. I think that it is confusing and unnecessary. Northern mills will have to compete and are now competing with miscellaneous fabricating and mechanical industries who pay more than cotton mills do usually, therefore the wage rates in the North will be higher than the wage rate in the South. Congressman Connery, I would also like to establish with you that the South does not need a lower wage to attract industry. 35 During the New Deal, those who supported the minimum wage employed rhetoric similar to the efficiency rhetoric used during the earlier Progressive period. One business leader in testimony before Congress stated:
It has been our experience that as our wages have increased we have been able to offset the increase very often by better methods of management, better buying, better processes, using all the scientific and engineering methods developed, by using better scheduling in the shipment of small orders, less idle time. Modern management methods are one of the most effective means of raising wages.36
Others viewed the rhetoric differently. They saw the use of the minimum wage and the language of Southern economic development as an attempt to protect the highwage industries in the North from competition by the Southern labor market. Gavin Wright has presented the Southern labor market as a unique entity, totally isolated from the national economy. Despite the fact that industry was moving into the South, production techniques rested by and large on low-skilled workers. Even though there were outside demands in terms of regional competitive pressures, which, according to economic theory, should have forced up wages in the South, most Southern employers were not paying wages any higher during the bustling 1920s than they had been before. The national wage standards introduced during the 1930s, were, in effect, imposed on many Southern industries, with textiles being hit particularly hard.
The idea behind laws like the NRA and, later, the FLSA was that recovery could be encouraged by prohibiting firms from engaging in cutthroat competition. And indeed, the effects of these laws were far greater on low-wage industries than highwage industries, and were experienced more in the South than in the North. Even a progressive like Walter Lippman referred to the FLSA as "in truth a sectional bill disguised as humanitarian reform."37 Or as Wright explains, the history of the Southern economy is not a study of economic development, but a "case of a region being forced off of one growth trajectory and onto another, a case in fact of one large group of people being forced out of the economy altogether, and ... another, more affluent group coaxed in." 38 These sentiments were well expressed in legislative debate over the first federal minimum wage bill in 1937. Those in the South specifically viewed the bill as yet another attempt by Washington to interfere with state sovereignty. In his testimony before Congress, John Edgerton, president of the Southern States Industrial Council, made it clear that although Southern industry would welcome minimum wages, maximum hours, and child labor regulations, they could not accept centralized control. As he put it:
What southern industry is mortally afraid of is the result of domination of all industry in the United States by a board with its headquarters in WashingtonÂ-be it a five man board or any kind of a board. Inevitably, the majority of such a board would represent majority interests in other sections with which the South must compete.39
Or as B. W Stonebicker, representing the Southern Association of Ornamental Metal Manufacturers put it:
There is no question in our minds, and I believe you will agree with us, in the South we are easier going, we do not drive the men to the last pitch that they do in the North and the city. In fact, you cannot drive them. Another thing, our mechanics are widely scattered. We cannot pick them up like they can in the eastern cities, and we have to train and raise them. And living conditions are extremely different. We have men down there that we pay 50 cents an hour. They will see in the papers they can get 90 and 95 in Washington or Baltimore, and they will strike out for it. I have never had one leave, I think that did not send word or write us a letter in about 1 or 2 weeks time and ask whether he could not come back home.
He went on to assert that since the Civil War, nobody but a Southerner could really understand the problems of the South. 40 Nevertheless, in response to claims that federal policy might drive certain firms out of business, the Roosevelt administration echoed an argument made by Edward Filene during the Progressive period, namely that it might be better if these firms did go under. Filene argued that any business that could not pay a living wageÂ-a wage sufficient to sustain a base of consumers who would be in a position to patronize other businessesÂ-was not good for the community and had no right to be part of it. 41 The concept of a minimum wage as a vehicle to achieving a larger public purpose, whether it was the alleviation of poverty, economic development, or increased productivity, often assumed the type of rhetoric that would promote that public purpose. Though the establishment of a minimum wage would no doubt alleviate the poverty of some in the short term, poverty discourse, by and large, was not the prevailing rhetoric used to promote the minimum wage. More successful arguments in favor of the minimum wage generally employed other language.
What, then, changed to narrow the scope of debate from these broad macroeconomic and efficiency arguments to the current debate between those opposing minimum wage increases because they result primarily in a youth disemployment effect and those supporting them because they will assist the poor? It may be conceded that those who couch the issue within the narrow parameters of youth disemployment effects see themselves as being infused with a public purpose, namely maintaining employment opportunities for low-skilled workers and preventing inflation. An argument could be made that at the same time as the coalescence of certain political and economic circumstances (i.e., the process of industrialization and the resultant wage instability along with the need of politicians, especially the Democratic Party, to build a broad electoral coalition that would include labor) served to broaden the scope of debate, the coalescence of other circumstances served to limit it. Among those circumstances was the rise of what some might refer to as the new economismÂ-an over-reliance on statistical studies to demonstrate the effects of the wage on specific segments of the population.42
Donald McCloskey suggests that mathematical technique, statistics, diagrams, and explicit simulation, once viewed by economists as useless, have become the mainstay of the economist's rhetorical arsenal in an effort to persuade others.43
When reformers were arguing for a minimum wage for women during the Progressive period, they relied on the burgeoning field of statistics to demonstrate the necessity of the wage for them. The new statistics, as they were often called, showed the extent to which female workers lived in poverty and how much they would need to subsist. During the 1950s, statistics began to be put to a new use: estimating the effects of minimum wage increases on both general employment levels and specific segments of the labor market. As part of the 1955 minimum wage amendments, a new evaluation program was mandated that would institutionalize routine statistical analyses of the wage, as well as estimates of its effects. More importantly, it would set the stage for a new drama that was to begin during the 1970s, namely studies that showed that minimum wage increases adversely affected teenagers. Not only were teenagers shouldering the brunt of these adverse effects, it was estimated that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage would result in a teen disemployment effect of 1 -3 percent.44 These studies came to form the basis of a consensus that was canonized as the conventional wisdom.
The End of Macro Policy
During the 1980s the nature of the political debate over the minimum wage did begin to change. The election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency marked the return to favor of the economic view that government was the problem, rather than the solution to the nation's economic and social problems. Summing up the goals of economic policy, George Stigler argued that "The supreme goal of the Western World is the development of the individual: the creation for the individual of a maximum area of personal freedom, and with this a corresponding area of personal responsibility. "45 As noble as policies such as the minimum wage might be at providing a safety net or reducing income inequalities, they were fundamentally at odds with the tenets of personal freedom.
The Reagan administration made no secret of its views that too much interference in the economy was the principal reason the economy had been in a recession during the 1970s. Inflation was, by and large, a product of wages being bid up, without corresponding gains to productivity, a problem attributed in large part to labor unions. Although the number of workers associated with unions never exceeded 30 percent of the total workforce during the 1950s, it dipped below 19 percent during the 1980s. 46 There are perhaps several reasons why union membership has declined, but the Reagan administration's handling of the PATCO air traffic controllers strike stands out as important.
When PATCO went on strike, which for federal workers was against the law, the response was both swift and harsh. President Reagan fired all striking workers, and in so doing sent a clear message to labor unions across the country that any form of union militancy would not be tolerated. 47 Although the NLRA never really barred the replacement of striking workers, until that point no employers wanted to resort to that tactic for fear of the negative publicity it might bring. But with Reagan's firing of PATCO workers, the earlier taboo had finally been broken. 48 The result, as Michael Piore observes, was that it "galvanized anti-union managerial factions in a whole variety of industries and occupations where union organization had previously been unassailable. And it set the stage for a prolonged period of union givebacks and concession bargaining." More than anything else, the firing of the PATCO workers marked a shift in how government viewed labor. In this new climate, labor, because it was perceived as always demanding more money, was seen as the source of whatever economic problems were plaguing the country. In 1981, the FLSA was amended and was not again amended until 1989. The minimum wage was essentially allowed to fall relative to average wages, from 47 percent in 1981 to 35 percent in 1989, the longest and most sustained decline since the introduction of the minimum wage in the 1930s. 49 It was not just a question of whether there was a systematic strategy designed to maintain what Sabel and Piore call the "low-road"50Â-low-wage strategies over high-wage strategiesÂ-but the emphasis of government policy was shifting from one geared to the maintenance of full employment to one predicated on resisting inflation. 51 To the extent that inflation became the chief priority, policies that could in any way boost wages were viewed as suspect. Also given studies showing that minimum wages to benefit the poor were poorly targeted, the minimum wage was thought to be no longer any help in reducing poverty.
Consistent with these changing priorities, NLRB and Supreme Court decisions increasingly became hostile to union goals. The tendency was toward a more restrictive interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). There were several assumptions underlying a substantial portion of existing legal doctrine: 1) The continuity of production must be maintained and limited only when statutory language clearly protected employee interference; 2) Employees act irresponsibly unless controlled; 3) Employees possess limited status in the workplace and, therefore, they owe a considerable measure of respect and deference to their employers; and 4) The enterprise is under management's control, with great stress being placed upon the employer's property rights in controlling the workplace. The NLRA was interpreted to mean that although the act might suggest participatory goals for workers, workers can never become full-fledged partners in any business, as such a partnership might interfere with management's exclusive property rights.52 This point became patently clear in First National Maintenance Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board when the Supreme Court ruled that management decisions to close a plant did not fall within the range of issues that would have to be discussed in collective-bargaining negotiations.53
For some, the assault on unions and the decline in the value of the minimum wage was a matter of deliberate government policy aimed at achieving a low-wage economy.54 Not only was there an assault on labor, but the thrust of the new ideology was on dismantling the entire welfare state. In the area of social policy, the administration moved to limit eligibility for public assistance and reduce benefit levels. While assistance programs were being reduced, job training programs, like the Comprehensive Training Employment Program (CETA), were being completely eliminated. On the regulatory front, the administration was only accelerating the pace of deregulation begun in the Carter administration. Students of welfare policy were quick to label administration policy as a war on the poor with the intended goal being the creation of a reserve army of labor. At the very least, it appeared as though the interests of capital and the propertied classes were receiving a new Bill of Rights at the expense of workers and the poor.55 It was also during this period of assault on labor unions that the number of minimum wage workers declined, the rate of poverty increased, and the value of the wage dropped considerably.
The point is that on one level the decline of unions and the stagnation of the minimum wage really cannot be separated. But on another level, the minimum wage policies were very much in keeping with the general climate of program cuts. This shift in government policy reflected the new conservatism, which in many respects represented a return to classical liberalism's philosophy about the relationship between the individual and the stateÂ-an understanding also consistent with the reemerging emphasis of free market ideology. The minimum wage as macro policy had rested in part on an assumption that low wages and general welfare were societal problems that the community at large had a responsibility to address. This was precisely the focus that Stigler argued against. With the return to a free market focus, the emphasis was on the individual to improve him or herself through education and training so that he or she would be in a position to command higher wages. It was not society's responsibility to raise wages.
To some extent, the political tide of the 1980s represented a return to the constitutional logic of the Lochner eraÂ-a period in American constitutional jurisprudential history that epitomized laissez-faire economics and the liberty of contract. During the Lochner era, the courts required convincing proof that a state action would not violate the rights of the individual, or, if it did, it had to be clear that the public interest would be served. 56 The focus on empiricism during the 1980s seemed to suggest the same, but with a different twist. That is, in the absence of any real proof that 1) the minimum wage did not cause unemployment and 2) a larger proportion of the labor market other than teenagers could benefit from a rise in the minimum, there was no legitimate basis to consider such an increase. In fact, the Minimum Wage Study Commission, also a defining characteristic of minimum wage legislation during the 1980s, appeared to confirm such thinking when it released findings that a ten percent increase in the wage would result in a one percent decrease in employment among teenagers.57
The rhetoric also changed. For those who wanted to narrow the scope of debate, the focus was increasingly on the individual and the individual's need to obtain the requisite education and skills to justify higher wages. Just as much of the literature on poverty and welfare was moving away from structural concerns and focusing more on behavioral traits, so too the focus was shifting in the rhetoric about the minimum wage. The minimum wage, it was argued, need not be raised because individuals lacked the appropriate skills to justify higher pay. In this way, the minimum wage debate began to mirror the one on welfare, which conservatives argued created disincentives to work and relieved the poor of their personal responsibility.58 Just as the government did not owe the poor public assistance as compensation for their behavioral deficiencies, it did not owe them a guarantee of a living wage as compensation for their skills deficiencies. Testifying before a congressional committee, Labor Secretary William Brock made it clear that the Reagan administration's position was that raising the minimum wage was bad policy because it would hurt younger workers and would not reduce poverty. The issue was not to help the working poor (or what some would regard as low productivity workers) by raising the minimum wage; rather such workers would best be helped through education and training programs. As Brock put it:
Given the current job creation atmosphere and the increasing demand for a highly skilled and highly literate labor pool, we are indeed facing a crisis in this country. That crisis is the prospect of entering the next century with a bifurcated societyÂ-not simply divided between those who are employed or unemployed, but more importantiy, divided between those who are unemployable.59
The rhetoric during the Bush administration was no different. Though willing to back a compromise plan on the minimum wage that included a subminimum or "training wage" for teenagers, the real issues were still considered to be education and training. If people wanted to earn more, it was incumbent upon them to acquire the training and skills necessary to command higher wages. Testifying before Congress, Labor Secretary Elizabeth Hanford Dole made it clear that improvements in training and education were the more urgent challenges to employment policy, especially since the real problem was a skills gap. As she stated:
We need to recognize that the poverty population and the minimum wage earners are different people, by and large. We need to be clear about what we are trying to do. If we want to help people out of poverty, then we need to look at literacy and basic skills, which are the root to the better-paying jobs our economy is creating. Raising the minimum wage has little relation either to skills provision or to the poverty population.60
Paul Kamolnick suggests that the politics of the minimum wage has always been at root another episode in the larger political class struggle over capitalist wage relations. The nature of these politics and the character of the debate suggest that for the future minimum wage campaigns need to return to demands for a living wage as it was conceived by those who originally framed the FLSA in 1938.61 That is, because minimum wage debates at root represent manifestations of traditional class struggles, it would be useful to couch the debate in terms of what society owes to those workers, especially low-skilled ones, in terms of guaranteeing that they will be able to earn a living wage. Nonetheless such a focus could neglect another point. The use of rhetoric, especially the rhetoric of individualism, can effectively obscure the true intentions of any group that has a vested interest in a particular outcome. Over 50 years ago, George Orwell wrote about how euphemisms might easily be substituted for the purpose of masking what otherwise might be unpleasant.62 When managers talk about the inefficiency of the minimum wage, are they not really attempting to avoid the issue of whether in the absence of a wage floor there will be exploitation? Instead of explaining why workers in certain segments of the economy would earn lower wages in the absence of a minimum wage, one side of the debate distinguishes between low-productivity and high-productivity jobs. To state that low-productivity jobs are not worth paying a higher wage without any rationale (i.e., a set of criteria for determining what makes a particular job worth more than another) would simply be unpleasant. Moreover, it diverts attention from the system and lodges responsibility at the level of the individual. According to this individualistic rhetoric, the issue ceases to be one of whether employers should pay livable wages and becomes one of whether the employee possesses sufficient skills to make him/her productive enough to command higher wages. If the issue is productivity, then the burden of raising it is placed on the individual and insofar as the system may in any way be involved, the issue becomes whether the system can offer the right types of programs aimed at raising the skill levels and hence, the productivity of these workers. Politically speaking, employers bear no responsibility which is in keeping with individualistic presuppositions underpinning America's political and economic culture. Albert Hirschman has suggested that there is nothing certain about the supposed adverseÂ-what he refers to as the perverseÂ-effects of the minimum wage. "But the undoubted possibility of a perverse outcome," Hirschman writes, " makes for an excellent debating point which is bound to be brought up in any polemic." 63 By relying on this individualistic rhetoric, more communitarian notions of responsibility are effectively obscured. Ultimately, it is a question of maintaining communal welfare according to the shared values of the community. If we as a society maintain that work is ultimately what defines us as good citizens,64 we ought also to take the view that one who is willing to work should be entitled to receive a livable wage. People should have a right to live in dignity, which might entail receiving a living wage. They should be paid livable wages so that communal arrangements will in fact be more equitable. The rhetoric of individualism does ultimately lead to a negation of communal responsibility for wage rates.
By placing the burden of skill acquisition on the individual, society does not have to confront the issue at all, let alone decide the appropriate policies that would yield higher wage rates. And yet, in certain types of jobs, such as the fast food industry or working a cash register in retail sales, how would workers upgrade their skills? Flipping burgers at a faster rate does not mean that more will be sold. The question arises as to whether employers are really serious when they talk about improving their workers' skills, or if they simply are throwing up a canard as a way of diverting attention from what many of them may see as the crux of the matter? Though it cannot be proved, one can only speculate that they do not want to be forced to pay higher wages because there is a limit to how much they can pass on to consumers, and therefore their profits will be less. By invoking the argument of the minimum wage workers' deficient skills, the onus is placed back on the workers. It is no longer a matter of employers exploiting workers by paying inadequate wages because these workers do not justify high wages. If there is no exploitation there can be no justification for the state interfering with otherwise normal exchange relationships.
In a real sense, by shifting the focus of the debate to the characteristics of the labor marketÂ-particularly the deficiencies of many in itÂ-rather than the various impersonal forces that resulted in the inequitable distribution of education and skills, the effect was to absolve government of any responsibility for implementing change. In a larger sense, the debate has come full circle to the point it was prior to the adoption of the minimum wage. In the early years, skill deficiencies were clearly there, but the liberty of contract argument was much stronger. During the 1930s, however, the liberty of contract argument had been discredited and all that was left was the skills deficiency. The early philosophical arguments about government's role in society had given way to the more analyticalÂ-and to some extent more practicalÂ-arguments of whether the benefits from the role government assumed justified the costs. What was perhaps lost in these analyses were the larger philosophical questions of what type of society we would like to create and whether there are not some minimum standards for how people in our society should live.
It is also important to note that this shift in focus in the 1980s was occurring amidst the growing criticism of the War on Poverty and Great Society programs of the previous decades. Although the issues debated about the War on Poverty and Great Society programs were different from those about the minimum wage, the confluence between them in public discourse led to negative attitudes about the minimum wage. Because the Great Society programs were perceived to be a failure, any program that could in any way be viewed as a measure for alleviating poverty it was thought, must, by definition, also be a failure. Moreover, the further identification of the War on Poverty with urban African Americans only worked to reinforce the political isolation of poor African Americans. Their isolation served to strengthen political claims that their problems were not economic, but social. Inasmuch as this was believed to be true, it followed that economic programs aimed at offering them opportunity could in no way correct the social pathologies plaguing inner city communities because these problems were considered to be behavioral, not economic.65 Of course, these views were buttressed by a new social science that relied on the use of traditional methodologies, but for new ideological ends.66 But the reliance on social science methodology also served to legitimate the position of those seeking to narrow the debate. The language of those seeking to localize the conflict became the politically acceptable discourse. The anti-poverty basis of the minimum wage, and by extension that type of rhetoric, was effectively discredited.
Conclusion
When one type of rhetoric is discredited it becomes incumbent upon the groups in opposition to reformulate their arguments. To a large extent, the rhetoric surrounding the minimum wage debate has come full circle. Its beginning locus was on a living wage intended to give workers dignity and preserve their individualism. From there it proceeded through macro policy, which assumed responsibility to reside with outside forces, and then through a backlash that again sought to place responsibility with the individual.
Despite these various permutations, a central theme running throughout, employed by both those seeking to narrow and those seeking to socialize the conflict, has been the meaning of individual independence. Those who seek to narrow the conflict have viewed it as revolving around the absence of wage policies so that individuals can be self-reliant and take responsibility for themselves. Those who seek to widen the conflict have viewed it as revolving around government policy aimed at ensuring that workers earn a living wage so that they do not have to be dependent on the state for public assistance or other private charities.
These may well represent competing visions for which rhetoric serves as a practical expression. The motives behind the rhetoric, however, may be more crude. Those who argue in favor of personal responsibility and self-reliance are not going to come out and say "quite frankly, low-skilled workers aren't worth any more, and we really don't care if they are poor." Similarly, supporters of the minimum wage are not going to come out and say "We support the minimum wage because it makes unionizedÂ-which generally tends to be more skilledÂ-workers more attractive." And yet, even though those pushing for higher minimum wages using the renewed rhetoric of a living wage may be using different language, their motives are as they always have beenÂ-to achieve a livable wage. At the same time, it does not mean that there may not be a new appreciation among those who have traditionally been skeptical of minimum wage increases for the role that the minimum wage can play for achieving a variety of economic goals, such as income distribution. 67 New empirical literature showing minimum wage increases to have little effect on employment in an environment that has seen the value of the minimum wage fall and wage inequality rise has only worked to put the minimum wage back on the table. 68 In addition to new findings that suggest that increases do not necessarily have the predicted textbook effect, there also appears to be a new understanding that the collapse of the minimum wage as well as the declining power of unions and fewer welfare protections may have contributed to rising wage inequality.69 Despite shifting rhetoric, certain realities have remained the same. Just as economic transformations in the past have left low-skilled workers in states of vulnerability, so too have more recent transformations, i.e., from industrialism to post-industrialism. Until recently, wages of low-skilled workers have not kept pace with inflation. Also until recently, the dependent poor had little incentive to forsake welfare for lowwage workÂ-jobs most likely to pay minimum wagesÂ-because they would not have been any better off from working.70 But in the last couple of years, welfare policies that may have had the effect of raising the reservation wages of the poor have been changed so that they have no choice but to enter the labor market.
While living wage ordinances may have their political appeal, it would also appear that a new appreciation for the role that the minimum wage can play is leading some to reassess its use for accomplishing more than simply attaining a livable wage. Richard Freeman, in particular, has observed that in the United States the minimum wage can both improve the well being of some low-wage workers while also slowing down the growing wage inequality. Moreover, it can serve to reorient the nature of the political and policy debate. As Freeman puts it: "If a minimum wage directs the attention toward the need to develop long-term policies that augment the productivity and skills of the low-paid, and of the firms for whom they work, it can provide an additional service as well as redistributing modest amounts to the low-paid."71 Notes
